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LAWYERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER TITLE 
III OF THE ADA:  ENSURING 
COMMUNICATION ACCESS FOR THE DEAF 
AND HARD OF HEARING 
Elana Nightingale Dawson* 
 Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act requires 
that public accommodations provide the auxiliary aid or 
service necessary to ensure effective communication with the 
deaf and hard of hearing.  Lawyers’ offices are among the 
many locations and services covered by Title III.  
Unfortunately, many lawyers are unaware of this fact.  
Furthermore, as currently designed, the ADA creates little 
opportunity for the rights afforded by Title III to be 
successfully enforced against lawyers.  This reality is 
particularly problematic for the deaf and hard of hearing 
community.  The auxiliary aid or service necessary to 
accommodate a deaf or hard of hearing client often requires an 
out-of-pocket expense on the part of her attorney.  In a world 
where lawyers are accustomed to passing on client-related 
costs to the client, the idea of absorbing such costs is 
antithetical.  This Article looks at the history and 
implementation of Title III to explain why its effectiveness has 
been limited within the legal profession.  It also explores the 
realities facing deaf and hard of hearing people seeking legal 
representation.  Finally, this Article proposes a detailed three-
pronged approach to free Title III from its current state of 
paralysis.  First, lawyers must know their obligations to deaf 
and hard of hearing clients.  Second, financial resources must 
be set aside to pay for the auxiliary aid or service required.  
Third, both Congress and the Court must take action to 
change the current remedies available under Title III.  
Progress must be made on all of these fronts in order for Title 
III to be the tool Congress intended. 
                                                 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor Degree, Northwestern University School of Law, 2011.  The 
author thanks Howard Rosenblum, Debra Lefler, Colleen McNamara, and Danielle Levine 
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.  The author would also like to thank Joshua 
Reece and the editors of the Valparaiso University Law Review for their invaluable editorial 
contributions.  The views expressed, and any misstatements, are solely those of the author. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Nearly ten million Americans are hard of hearing and almost one 
million are functionally deaf.1  The Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”) is designed not only to cover the approximately eleven million 
deaf and hard of hearing Americans, but also the almost fifty million 
Americans with recognizable disabilities.2  As Senator Larry E. Craig 
pointed out, “[t]he ADA is truly vast in its scope.”3  The ADA’s coverage 
of public accommodations, as provided for in Title III of the Act, reaches 
even farther than the analogous portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“CRA”),4 which prohibits racial discrimination in public 
accommodations.  Professional offices, such as those of a lawyer, are one 
such entity that is specifically named in the ADA but not in the CRA.5 
Despite its broad aspirations, Title III does not adequately protect the 
rights of deaf and hard of hearing people who seek legal services.  A 
person who is deaf or hard of hearing may need an interpreter, note-
taker, or other accommodation in order to fully benefit from a lawyer’s 
services.  But these accommodations can be expensive, which makes 
lawyers reluctant to provide them at their own cost.  Additionally, 
lawyers have no incentive to comply with Title III’s requirements 
because they are unlikely to suffer any consequences from not 
complying with the law.  Title III’s coverage of a lawyer’s office creates a 
catch-22 for deaf and hard of hearing people who encounter an 
inaccessible attorney.  Title III only allows for injunctive relief in private 
actions.6  The deaf or hard of hearing person must sue their own attorney 
in order to force the attorney to comply with Title III.  If they find a new 
attorney, they no longer have standing to sue the non-compliant 
attorney.  Needless to say, suing one’s own attorney is not the best way 
to foster an attorney-client relationship. 
                                                 
1 Ross E. Mitchell, How Many Deaf People Are There in the United States?  Estimates from 
the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 11 J. DEAF STUD. & DEAF EDUC. 112, 112 (2006). 
2 See JUDITH WALDROP & SHARON M. STERN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DISABILITY STATUS:  
2000 1 (2003) (“Census 2000 counted 49.7 million people with some type of long lasting 
condition or disability.”).  The number of people covered under the ADA has likely 
increased significantly in light of the recently adopted amendments to the ADA that 
expand the definition of disability.  See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553 (rejecting various Supreme Court decisions that limited the definition of 
disability under the ADA). 
3 Larry E. Craig, The Americans with Disabilities Act:  Prologue, Promise, Product, and 
Performance, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 205, 212 (1999). 
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (2006). 
5 Id. § 12181(7)(F). 
6 Id. § 12188(a)(1)–(2). 
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Because most ADA scholarship focuses on the ADA’s employment 
discrimination provision, Title I, many solutions to ADA-related 
problems are framed from an employment discrimination perspective.7  
Numerous commentators have assumed that these solutions will resolve 
the challenges faced under all Titles of the ADA.8  Professor Michael 
Waterstone challenges this assumption, arguing that Title II and Title 
III’s success has been limited as the result of their enforcement 
mechanisms.9  This Article takes Waterstone’s argument one step further.  
Just as Title I arguments do not always translate neatly into Title II and 
Title III contexts, accommodations required for one disabled population 
will not always sufficiently accommodate other disabled populations.  
Furthermore, within Title III, different public accommodations present 
different challenges to ADA enforcement.  Title III covers a broad array 
of entities, from hotels to hospitals to grocery stores, thus limiting the 
success of the one-size-fits-all approach to regulations and remedies 
utilized by Title III.10 
This Article begins to fill the gap in ADA scholarship by focusing on 
one place of public accommodation and its accessibility to one disabled 
population.11  Like much of the ADA, Title III has a lot of promise, but 
without change, it will never accomplish its ultimate goals.  Title III’s 
shortcomings become very clear when looking at how Title III works in 
reality, as opposed to how it looks on paper.  This Article argues that 
Title III is ineffective in regulating lawyers and thus leaves the deaf and 
hard of hearing unrepresented and potentially discriminated against 
even further.  Title III has not resulted in the voluntary compliance 
Congress hoped for,12 as evidenced by the difficulties that deaf and hard 
of hearing individuals face when attempting to obtain counsel.13 
                                                 
7 Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1809 (2005). 
8 Id. at 1809–10. 
9 Id. at 1810. 
10 See infra Part III (explaining why Title III is a “servant to many masters” and 
examining the entities it covers). 
11 See infra notes 37–39 and accompanying text (introducing the statutory definition of 
“place of public accommodation” and explaining that a lawyer fits within this definition). 
12 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
ACT:  CHALLENGES, BEST PRACTICES, AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCCESS 179–85 (2007) 
[hereinafter NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION] (discussing the “[r]easons for 
[w]idespread [n]oncompliance with Title III”); see also 136 CONG. REC. 17,376 (1990) 
(statement of Sen. Robert Dole) (exemplifying congressional expectation that the ADA 
remedies would result in less discrimination when stating that “[t]he tough but fair 
enforcement remedies of ADA, which parallel the Civil Rights Act of 1964, are time-tested 
incentives for compliance and disincentives for discrimination”). 
13 NAD Advocacy Statement:  Communication Access Funds for Legal Services, NAT’L ASS’N 
OF THE DEAF, http://www.nad.org/issues/justice/lawyers-and-legal-services/ 
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First, Part II discusses the history of the ADA’s passage and briefly 
summarizes the final version of Title III.  In doing so, it shows how the 
ADA’s history contributed to the current failure of Title III to effectively 
serve the deaf and hard of hearing population attempting to obtain legal 
counsel.  Then, Part III explains how and why Title III has fallen short of 
its main goal—“to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable 
standards addressing discrimination [by public accommodations] 
against individuals with disabilities.”14  Next, Part IV proposes a three-
part solution that will begin to free Title III from its current state of 
paralysis.  And finally, Part V concludes by explaining how the 
implementation of the proposed three-part solution and continued focus 
on the challenges facing the deaf and hard of hearing trying to obtain 
counsel can help to move Title III exponentially closer to the life-
changing legislation it was intended to be. 
II.  HOW WE GOT HERE:  THE ADA & TITLE III 
On July 26, 1990, then-President George H. W. Bush signed the ADA 
into law, declaring:  “Let the shameful wall of exclusion finally come 
tumbling down.”15  The enactment of the ADA marked the beginning of 
a new era for the disability civil rights movement.  The ADA’s goal was 
to provide social and economic equality for the disabled, leading some 
Senators to call it the “Emancipation Proclamation for all persons with 
disabilities.”16 
The ADA’s road to passage was not entirely smooth.  While it was 
still moving through Congress, Senator Tom Harkin introduced a 
revised version of the ADA.  Included in Senator Harkin’s ADA draft 
were two important changes to Title III.  First, the definition of public 
accommodations was broadened to include “all privately operated 
establishments ‘that are used by the general public as customers, clients, 
                                                                                                             
communication-access-funds (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) [hereinafter NAD Advocacy 
Statement] (“People who are deaf continue to encounter significant communication barriers 
when attempting to obtain private legal services and representation . . . .”) (footnote 
omitted). 
14 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2006). 
15 PETER BLANCK ET AL., DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY xxxiv (2004). 
16 136 CONG. REC. 17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin) (“The ADA is, indeed, 
the 20th century Emancipation Proclamation for all persons with disabilities.”); see also 135 
CONG. REC. 19,888 (1989) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (describing the ADA in 
similar terms, when he said, “In a sense, this legislation is an emancipation proclamation 
for the disabled, and America will be better.”). 
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or visitors; or that are potential places of employment.’”17  Second, 
compensatory damages were made available as a remedy in private 
actions, with relief modeled after the relief available under the Fair 
Housing Act (“FHA”).18 
Senator Harkin’s changes, however, brought about concern and 
opposition.  Most notably, the Bush Administration stated that it would 
only agree to expansive coverage of private and public entities under 
Title III if remedies were limited to injunctive relief for private actions, 
the same remedy available under the CRA.19  In order to ensure 
continued bipartisan support while maintaining Title III’s broader reach, 
legislators reached a compromise20—Title III remedies for private actions 
would mirror those available under section 2000a-3 of the CRA.21 
Senator Edward Kennedy noted his concern with a remedial scheme 
that only allowed for injunctive relief in private actions, stating “we have 
seen in the past that where we do not provide an adequate remedy we 
do not get compliance.”22  According to Senator Kennedy, both the then-
President and Attorney General promised to support making the 
remedies stronger if they were not effective.23  In defense of the new 
remedies, Senator Bob Dole asserted that “[t]he tough but fair 
enforcement remedies of [the] ADA, which parallel the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, are time-tested incentives for compliance and disincentives for 
discrimination.”24 
Congressional proponents of using the CRA remedial approach for 
the ADA believed it would be adequate simply because of its success in 
                                                 
17 RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM:  THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT 33 (2005) [hereinafter COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM] (quoting S. 933, 
101st Cong. § 401(2)(A)(i) (1989)). 
18 Id. 
19 Craig, supra note 3, at 215–16. 
20 COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 173; see also 135 CONG. REC. 19,803 
(1989) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin) (referring to the “cutback [of] the remedies included 
in the original bill in exchange for a broad scope of coverage under the public 
accommodations title of the bill” as a “fragile compromise”). 
21 The Civil Rights Act provides remedies as follows: 
[w]henever any person has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that any person is about to engage in any act or practice 
prohibited . . . , a civil action for preventive relief, including an 
application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, 
or other order, may be instituted by the person aggrieved. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (2006). 
22 135 CONG. REC. 19,841 (1989). 
23 See id. (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (referencing the need in 1988 to revisit the 
1968 Fair Housing Act because inadequate remedies resulted in a lack of compliance). 
24 136 CONG. REC. 17,376 (1990) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole). 
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the CRA.25  Those who initially advocated for stronger remedies, such as 
those available under the FHA, acquiesced to the compromise on 
remedies in the interest of getting the entire ADA, including broad 
public accommodation coverage under Title III, passed.26  Then-Attorney 
General Richard Thornburgh did, however, note that reevaluation of the 
ADA over time would be necessary in order to determine whether it was 
effective as initially passed.27 
While ultimately receiving bipartisan support, the final version of 
the ADA was “the result of extensive scrutiny, debate, and compromise 
involving Members of Congress, the administration, and the business 
and disability communities.”28  Because of the compromises and 
negotiations necessary to get the Act through Congress, 
“straightforwardness and clarity ultimately gave way to political reality, 
requiring some disingenuousness.”29  The result, suggests Professor 
Bonnie Poitras Tucker, was “a law that many courts view as sending 
conflicting messages.”30 
The ADA version finally passed by Congress had three main 
focuses:  disability-based discrimination by employers,31 the 
government,32 and public accommodations.33  Disability-based 
discrimination by employers, prohibited by Title I, is the most litigated 
Title of the ADA and, not surprisingly, has received the most scholarly 
attention.34  Some scholars have referred to Title I as being “[a]t the heart 
of the promise of the ADA.”35  The scarcity of scholarship focusing on 
Title II and Title III, however, does not suggest that these Titles have 
achieved complete success.  Instead, the overwhelming focus on the 
ADA’s employment provisions has simply placed that provision more 
firmly on the public’s consciousness. 
Title III requires public accommodations to take the steps necessary 
to ensure access for people with disabilities.36  A public accommodation, 
                                                 
25 COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 174. 
26 Id. at 172–74. 
27 Id. at 174. 
28 136 CONG. REC. 17,366 (1990) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin). 
29 Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving Door:  Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights 
Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 340 (2001). 
30 Id. 
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112–12117 (2006). 
32 Id. §§ 12131–12165. 
33 Id. §§ 12181–12189. 
34 Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1809. 
35 BLANCK, supra note 15, at 2–28. 
36 When prohibiting discrimination, Title III states that such prohibited action includes 
a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no 
individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or 
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under Title III, is any private entity included in one of the twelve listed 
categories whose operations affect commerce.37  The “office of an 
accountant or lawyer” is included in the definition.38  Therefore, lawyers 
must provide auxiliary aids or services to any deaf or hard of hearing 
client, unless doing so would prove an undue burden.39  An auxiliary aid 
or service is required when it is “necessary to ensure effective 
communication with individuals with disabilities.”40  Like any public 
accommodation, lawyers cannot pass along the cost of an auxiliary aid or 
service to the disabled person.41 
Auxiliary aids and services include a wide variety of 
accommodations.  Appropriate auxiliary aids and services for the deaf 
and hard of hearing usually include “[q]ualified interpreters, notetakers, 
[and] computer-aided transcription services.”42  The Title III regulations 
define a qualified interpreter as “an interpreter who is able to interpret 
effectively, accurately and impartially both receptively and expressively, 
using any necessary specialized vocabulary.”43  The definition of the 
term “[q]ualified interpreter” is important because people often 
                                                                                                             
otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the 
absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can 
demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the 
nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or 
accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
37 Id. § 12181(7)(A)–(F). 
38 Id. § 12181(7)(F). 
39 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
40 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c) (2009). 
41 Id. § 36.301(c). 
42 Id. § 36.303(b)(1).  In full, the regulation states the following: 
The term “auxiliary aids and services” includes— 
 (1) Qualified interpreters, notetakers, computer-aided 
transcription services, written materials, telephone handset amplifiers, 
assistive listening devices, assistive listening systems, telephones 
compatible with hearing aids, closed caption decoders, open and 
closed captioning, telecommunications devices for deaf persons 
(TDD’s), videotext displays, or other effective methods of making 
aurally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing 
impairments; 
 (2) Qualified readers, taped texts, audio recordings, Brailled 
materials, large print materials, or other effective methods of making 
visually delivered materials available to individuals with visual 
impairments; 
 (3) Acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; and 
 (4) Other similar services and actions. 
Id. § 36.303(b). 
43 Id. § 36.104. 
Dawson: Lawyers' Responsibilities Under Title III of the ADA: Ensuring Co
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
1150 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
misunderstand the important role that an interpreter plays, leading them 
to think that friends or family members are appropriate interpreters.44 
Lawyers must provide these auxiliary aids or services unless they 
can demonstrate that the required accommodation will cause them an 
undue burden or will fundamentally alter the goods or services offered 
by the attorney.  However, the provision of communication access 
ordinarily does not give rise to a fundamental alteration defense.45  The 
only defense available to an otherwise successful Title III claim is a 
showing that the required accommodation or modification will result in 
an undue burden on the lawyer.  Moreover, a public accommodation 
cannot claim that an accommodation is an undue burden simply because 
the public accommodation is small, such as a solo practitioner.46  “Undue 
burden,” in the context of Title III, has been defined as a “significant 
difficulty or expense.”47  Even if a lawyer has a legitimate undue burden 
defense, they are still obligated to provide an alternate option for 
accessibility.48  Various factors determine whether an accommodation 
                                                 
44 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. B, at 684–85 (2005) (describing the qualifications of family and 
friends as interpreters).  The appendix states: 
Public comment also revealed that public accommodations have at 
times asked persons who are deaf to provide family members or 
friends to interpret.  In certain circumstances, notwithstanding that the 
family member or friend is able to interpret or is a certified interpreter, 
the family member or friend may not be qualified to render the 
necessary interpretation because of factors such as emotional or 
personal involvement or considerations of confidentiality that may 
adversely affect the ability to interpret “effectively, accurately, and 
impartially.” 
Id. 
45 The fundamental alteration exception to Title III’s requirements usually arises in the 
context of a policy modification or significant programmatic change.  See, e.g., Robert L. 
Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-
Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 475 (1991) (Under Title III’s 
fundamental alteration exception, courts have not required alterations in the following 
situations: “if they would endanger a program’s viability; ‘massive’ or ‘extremely 
expensive’ changes are not required; modifications involving a ‘major restructuring’ of an 
enterprise or that ‘jeopardize the effectiveness’ of a program are not required; 
modifications are not required if they would so alter an enterprise as to create, in effect, a 
new program.” (footnotes omitted)). 
46 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006) (defining the term “public accommodation” in 
Title III without referencing size of any entity prohibited from discriminating based on 
disability), with id. § 12111(5)(A) (defining “employer” in Title I so as to exempt employers 
with fifteen or fewer employees from liability for disability discrimination). 
47 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. 
48 Id. § 36.303(f).  The regulation states: 
If provision of a particular auxiliary aid or service by a public 
accommodation would result in . . . an undue burden, i.e., significant 
difficulty or expense, the public accommodation shall provide an 
alternative auxiliary aid or service, if one exists, that would not result 
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qualifies as an undue burden, including the type of auxiliary aid needed 
and the lawyer’s overall financial resources.49  If an attorney invokes the 
undue burden defense, the alleged undue burden must be measured 
against the financial health of the lawyer’s (or firm’s) entire practice—not 
in light of the income earned from the disabled client.50  An undue 
burden does not exist simply because an attorney might lose money on a 
disabled client due to the cost of an auxiliary aid or service required by 
Title III.51 
If, however, a lawyer has no undue burden defense and is found 
liable for a Title III violation, he is unlikely to be punished for this 
violation because of the compromise Congress made limiting the 
penalties for Title III violations.52  Under Title III, if one pursues a private 
cause of action, it must be for “preventive relief, including an application 
                                                                                                             
in . . . such burden but would nevertheless ensure that, to the 
maximum extent possible, individuals with disabilities receive the 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations 
offered by the public accommodation. 
Id. 
49 Id. § 36.104.  The regulation delineates undue burden factors as follows: 
Undue burden means significant difficulty or expense.  In determining 
whether an action would result in an undue burden, factors to be 
considered include— 
 (1) The nature and cost of the action needed under this part; 
 (2) The overall financial resources of the site or sites involved in 
the action; the number of persons employed at the site; the effect on 
expenses and resources; legitimate safety requirements that are 
necessary for safe operation, including crime prevention measures; or 
the impact otherwise of the action upon the operation of the site; 
 (3) The geographic separateness, and the administrative or fiscal 
relationship of the site or sites in question to any parent corporation or 
entity; 
 (4) If applicable, the overall financial resources of any parent 
corporation or entity; the overall size of the parent corporation or 
entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, 
and location of its facilities; and 
 (5) If applicable, the type of operation or operations of any parent 
corporation or entity, including the composition, structure, and 
functions of the workforce of the parent corporation or entity. 
Id. 
50 See Eric Maxfield, Sign Language Interpreters: Who Pays?, COLO. LAW., Apr. 2004, at 29, 
32 (noting that an attorney must provide an interpreter in a pro bono case “unless such 
provision would cause an undue burden,” and that “whether a client is paying or 
represented pro bono is irrelevant”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (outlining the undue burden 
factors). 
51 See Victoria Chase & Kate Reznick, Business Law:  Serving the Deaf Client, PHILA. LAW., 
Summer 2004, http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/TPLSummer04DealClient?app 
Num=2 (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
52 See supra text accompanying notes 19–21 (explaining the remedies compromise 
reached in order to retain support for Title III). 
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for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other 
order.”53  A deaf or hard of hearing client suing his or her attorney for 
injunctive relief is trying to obtain a court order (injunction) forcing the 
attorney to provide the auxiliary aid or service, or a reasonable 
alternative, necessary for effective communication.54  While Title I and 
Title II allow for monetary damages in private actions,55 Title III only 
allows monetary damages in claims brought by the Attorney General.56  
When the Attorney General pursues a Title III claim, compensatory 
damages are capped at $50,000 for the first violation and $100,000 for any 
subsequent violations.57  Punitive damages are never recoverable under 
Title III.58 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is the government agency 
responsible for Title III complaint investigation.59  The DOJ also 
undertakes compliance review of entities covered by Title III.60  The DOJ 
does not investigate every complaint they receive.  Instead, the DOJ has 
complete discretion over whether to investigate complaints and will do 
so only “[w]here the Department has reason to believe that there may be 
a violation.”61  The DOJ will only bring a civil action when it believes 
there is a pattern or practice of discrimination or where the 
discrimination “raises an issue of general public importance.”62  When 
the DOJ is involved in a claim, they have dramatically higher pro-
plaintiff results (49.9%) than in cases that lack DOJ involvement 
(27.8%).63  However, the DOJ appears to be decreasing the number of 
complaints it investigates.64 
III.  TITLE III TODAY 
Title III is a servant to many masters.  In addition to regulating a 
wide variety of public accommodations, it also aims to make public 
                                                 
53 42 U.S.C § 2000a-3(a) (2006). 
54 See id. (describing a civil action under Title III). 
55 Id. §§ 12117(a), 12133. 
56 Id. § 12188(b)(2)(B); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:  TITLE III 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, COVERING PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND COMMERCIAL 
FACILITIES III-8.4000 (1993), available at http://www.ada.gov/taman3.html [hereinafter DOJ 
TITLE III MANUAL]. 
57 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(C). 
58 Id. § 12188(b)(4). 
59 DOJ TITLE III MANUAL, supra note 56, at III-8.3000. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at III-8.1000. 
63 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 168 (quoting 
Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1874). 
64 Id. 
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accommodations accessible to the entire disabled population.  The 
statutory design necessary to compel McDonald’s to provide a ramp for 
its wheelchair bound customers will not necessarily compel an attorney 
to provide a sign language interpreter for his deaf client.  The following 
section discusses how Title III is designed.  This section also 
demonstrates why Title III’s ability to regulate lawyers’ offices has been 
necessarily limited. 
A. Accommodation Mandate and the Cost of Compliance 
The crux of Title III is its “accommodation mandate.”65  An 
accommodation mandate exists when a party is required to “take special 
steps in response to the distinctive needs of particular, identifiable 
demographic groups.”66  Title III’s accommodation mandate requires 
public accommodations to make “reasonable modifications” to their 
policies, practices and procedures as well as taking “such steps as may 
be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, 
[or] denied services.”67  Critiques of the ADA’s accommodation 
mandates, which question whether an accommodation mandate is the 
appropriate way to create accessibility, focus almost exclusively on Title 
I.68  Critics of Title I contend that accommodations requiring ongoing 
financial commitment are economically inefficient and thus economically 
flawed.69  Economic inefficiency occurs when a market participant is 
forced to do something he or she does not view as profitable or 
beneficial.70  Under Title I, the market participant is the employer.  If 
employers believe that disabled workers require costly accommodations 
in order to perform their jobs effectively, we would expect employers to 
choose to hire nondisabled employees, absent regulations to the 
contrary.71  Title I’s accommodation mandate is also seen as shifting the 
burden of paying for accommodations from the government to private 
entities.72  Some scholars have questioned whether it makes sense to 
place the cost for providing accommodations on employers.73  Some also 
                                                 
65 Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 223 (2000). 
66 Id. at 231. 
67 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii) (2006). 
68 See id. § 12112(b)(5) (requiring employers, under Title I’s accommodation mandate, to 
provide reasonable accommodations to an identifiable demographic group—the disabled). 
69 Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 
79, 83–84 (2003). 
70 Id. at 120. 
71 Id. 
72 BLANCK, supra note 15, at 2–29. 
73 See Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1848 (“[C]ommentators have argued that 
the accommodation mandate is economically flawed (or at least of limited utility) in the 
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worry that the cost of accommodating a disabled worker discourages 
employers from hiring disabled workers in the first place, despite the 
ADA’s clear prohibition against disability-based discrimination.74 
Many of the critiques of Title I’s accommodation mandate also 
pertain to Title III.  However, Title III’s accommodation mandates have 
gotten little scholarly attention.  Professor Michael Waterstone suggests 
that this is because Title III’s mandate is not as theoretically troubling as 
the mandate of Title I.75  Accommodation requests under Title III “are 
often less personal and can apply to a range of customers.”76  As of 2005, 
there were very few Title III cases decided on the grounds that the 
accommodation presented an undue burden to the defendant, 
suggesting that most Title III accommodations require a reasonable one-
time expense.77  PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin further supports the belief that 
the modifications required under Title III impose minimal, if any, costs 
on the public accommodation.78  In PGA Tour, Casey Martin, who had a 
circulatory disorder, requested the use of a golf cart during a PGA 
tournament, despite the tournament’s rule against golf cart use.79  When 
the Supreme Court sided with Martin, the PGA Tour simply had to make 
an exception to their rule.80  Likewise, most of Title III’s more visible 
successes are the result of one-time expenditures:  elevators and ramps in 
new buildings, wheelchair accessible tables at Starbucks, and ATM 
machines with Braille. 
Missing from this analysis is the fact that accommodations under 
Title III typically take two forms:  physical access and communication 
access.  Physical access encompasses those items that people usually 
associate with the ADA—ramps, curb cuts, and elevators.81  Most 
physical access accommodations require a one-time outlay of funds and, 
                                                                                                             
employment sphere.”); see also Stein, supra note 69, at 144?78 (discussing the level of 
efficiency achieved by requiring employers to provide varying levels of accommodations). 
74 Jolls, supra note 65, at 275–76. 
75 Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1852. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 1852–53. 
78 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
79 Id. at 668–69. 
80 Id. at 690. 
81 Most Title II and Title III scholarship does not distinguish between physical access 
and communication access requirements, focusing solely on the requirement that public 
accommodations remove physical barriers.  See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of 
Limited Civil Rights Remedies:  The Case of “Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1 
(2006) (focusing on physical accommodation requirements under the ADA); Michael 
Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 474?78 (2007) 
[hereinafter Waterstone, New Vision] (discussing physical access cases involving public 
accommodations). 
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thereafter, require little if any expense.82  Communication access, on the 
other hand, often requires an ongoing financial commitment, which is 
more analogous to the types of expenses incurred by employers covered 
by Title I.  As such, many of the Title I accommodation mandate critiques 
also apply to Title III. 
Title III’s accommodation mandate, like Title I’s, can also be seen as 
shifting the cost of accommodations from the government to private 
entities, such as lawyers, particularly with respect to the deaf and hard of 
hearing.  Most auxiliary aids and services provided pursuant to Title III 
must be financed each time the disabled consumer utilizes the public 
accommodation’s services.83  A deaf patient who uses sign language 
needs a sign language interpreter for every doctor’s appointment.  
Moreover, the “less personal” element of Title III accommodations to 
which Waterstone refers disappears when a public accommodation must 
provide services to a deaf or hard of hearing patron.84  Furthermore, an 
auxiliary aid for the deaf does not always benefit a “range of 
customers.”85  All things being equal, a lawyer is just as likely to refuse to 
take on a deaf or hard of hearing client as an employer is to refuse to hire 
them.  The economics are the same—when one choice requires an 
additional, ongoing expense, there is no reason to expect a person to 
voluntarily make the more expensive choice. 
Title III’s accommodation mandate, when considered alongside its 
weak remedial scheme, disincentivizes voluntary compliance by 
attorneys who have deaf or hard of hearing clients.  Voluntary 
compliance is influenced by two things:  the cost of compliance and the 
risk of noncompliance.  The higher the cost, the greater the risk must be 
in order to achieve voluntary compliance and vice versa.  However, 
when the cost of complying with an accommodation mandate is high and 
there is very little risk associated with noncompliance, the public 
accommodation has very little incentive to abide by Title III. 
Title III compliance by lawyers is expensive and the risks associated 
with noncompliance are low.  Therefore, all things being equal, it will 
generally make less economic sense for a lawyer to take on a deaf or 
hard of hearing client instead of a hearing non-disabled client.  Lawyers 
                                                 
82 See Bagenstos, supra note 81, at 7 (noting that, with respect to barrier removal and 
physical access, “[s]upporters of the ADA frequently contend that the statute’s requirement 
of accessible public accommodations serves the interests of business by opening up a new 
market . . . [a]nd [that] the ADA’s requirements in this context are not particularly costly”). 
83 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2006) (“The term ‘auxiliary aids and services’ 
includes . . . qualified interpreters or other effective methods of making aurally delivered 
materials available to individuals with hearing impairments . . . .”). 
84 Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1852. 
85 Id. 
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are also in a unique position which allows them to avoid disabled clients 
simply by saying they do not have time.86  Moreover, because Title III 
does not allow for monetary damages in private suits, the potential cost 
of noncompliance is low.87  Compensatory damages, however, are 
available when the DOJ pursues a claim.  Yet, this does not happen 
frequently enough to realistically incentivize compliance.88  Nor does the 
cost of litigating an ADA claim incentivize compliance.  The only 
litigation cost risk a public accommodation bears is its own costs.89  Title 
III’s accommodation mandate has little chance of success without 
increased enforcement and a compensatory damages remedy. 
B. Government Enforcement of Title III 
According to a recent National Council on Disability report, “Title III 
is overwhelmingly underenforced.”90  Critics have called the DOJ’s 
enforcement of Title III “overly cautious, reactive, and lacking any 
coherent and unifying national strategy.”91  In fact, the DOJ “has devoted 
‘only a small cadre of lawyers’ to disability rights enforcement, and those 
lawyers must shoulder responsibility for enforcing the ADA against state 
and local governments as well as against private businesses.”92  As a 
result, the DOJ’s Disability Rights Section makes “decisions . . . not to 
open for investigation a large proportion of [public accommodations] 
complaints received,” which explains why there is a relatively low 
number of public accommodation enforcement actions.93  Thus attorneys 
who refuse to provide auxiliary aids and services to deaf and hard of 
                                                 
86 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. (2010) (“A lawyer should not accept 
representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without 
improper conflict of interest and to completion.”).  Therefore, a lawyer can avoid 
representing a client simply by saying they are too busy, in which case they are obligated, 
under Rules of Professional Conduct, to decline representation. 
87 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
88 See infra Part III.B. 
89 See infra Part III.C. 
90 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 12.  The National 
Council on Disability is “an independent federal agency making recommendations to the 
President and Congress on issues affecting 54 million Americans with disabilities.”  Office 
of Civil Rights, Disability Resources, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.doi.gov/ 
diversity/8able2.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2010).  See generally Jonathan Young, Living, 
Learning, and Earning Forums, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, http://www.ncd.gov/ (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2011) (describing the Council’s objectives through the eyes of its Chairman). 
91 Waterstone, New Vision, supra note 81, at 458–59. 
92 Bagenstos, supra note 81, at 9. 
93 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, PROMISES TO KEEP:  A DECADE OF FEDERAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 38 (2000), available at 
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2000/promises_1.htm (alterations in 
original). 
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hearing clients have little fear of DOJ action—certainly not enough 
necessary to effect change. 
There are two primary reasons for the DOJ’s lack of effectiveness in 
the Title III enforcement arena.  First, Congress has provided limited 
resources for DOJ enforcement of ADA violations.94  Second, and more 
importantly, the ADA does not require the DOJ to pursue every Title III 
complaint it receives.95  The DOJ need not pursue a Title III complaint 
unless it finds ‘“a pattern or practice’ of discrimination or ‘an issue of 
general public importance.’”96  The lack of an enforcement mandate, 
coupled with the DOJ’s limited resources, results in a “focus[] on large, 
high profile commercial defendants, and [an] emphasi[s on] settlements 
and consent decrees over litigation.”97  A non-compliant attorney will 
rarely qualify as a high profile commercial defendant, making Title III 
complaints against them of little interest to the DOJ.  Furthermore, the 
focus on settlements and consent decrees means businesses have very 
little public law to rely on when creating accessibility policies.98 
Only a few settlement agreements between the DOJ and attorneys 
who discriminated against their deaf or hard of hearing clients are 
publicly available.99  However, anecdotal reports from deaf rights 
advocates indicate that the problem is widespread.  Karen Aguilar, 
Associate Director of the Midwest Center for Law and the Deaf, reports 
significant difficulty when trying to match deaf and hard of hearing 
individuals with ADA-compliant lawyers.100  When Howard Rosenblum, 
a deaf attorney in Chicago, passed the bar in 1992 he was immediately 
flooded with calls from deaf and hard of hearing individuals throughout 
Illinois.101  He often had to explain that he was too far away or that he 
                                                 
94 Ruth Colker, ADA Title III:  A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 
404–05 (2000) [hereinafter Colker, ADA Title III]. 
95 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 11. 
96 Id. at 167–68 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(B) (2006)) (internal quotations omitted). 
97 Id. at 168. 
98 Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1874. 
99 E.g., Settlement Agreement By the United States of America, Clifford B. Hearn, Jr., and 
Clifford B. Hearn, Jr., P.A., Dep’t of Just. No. 202-15-37 (2008), 
http://www.ada.gov/hearn.htm; Settlement Agreement Between the United States of 
America and Joseph David Camacho, Esq., Albuquerque, New Mexico Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, Dep’t of Just. No. 202-4937 (2007), 
http://www.ada.gov/albuquerue.htm [hereinafter Camacho Settlement Agreement]; 
Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and Gregg Tirone, Esq., Dep’t 
of Justice No. 202-53-20 (2004), http://www.ada.gov/tirone.htm [hereinafter Tirone 
Settlement Agreement]. 
100 Telephone Interview with Karen Aguilar, Assoc. Dir., Midwest Ctr. for Law & the 
Deaf (Oct. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Aguilar Interview]. 
101 E-mail from Howard Rosenblum, Founder & Chair, Midwest Ctr. on L. & the Deaf, to 
author (Sept. 30, 2009, 12:33 CST) (on file with author). 
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did not specialize in the area of law in which the caller needed 
assistance.  The influx of interested potential clients demonstrated to 
Rosenblum the difficulties that the deaf and hard of hearing community 
experience when attempting to obtain legal representation.102  The 
following two cases illustrate how inaccessible the legal world is to the 
deaf and hard of hearing community. 
Kathleen Culhane Rozanski, a deaf woman in Rochester, NY, needed 
to hire an attorney to handle her divorce.  Ms. Rozanski communicates 
with sign language and also lipreads.103  She retained attorney Gregg 
Tirone.104  Her divorce involved a number of sensitive matters, including 
domestic violence, child custody, and issues involving a restraining 
order.  According to Ms. Rozanski, “Mr. Tirone failed to provide a 
qualified sign language interpreter during several meetings.”105  Mr. 
Tirone instead chose to communicate with Ms. Rozanski using “pen and 
paper, fax, lipreading, and by use of the National Relay Service when 
communicating by phone.”106  At times Ms. Rozanski’s sister, who also 
has some hearing loss, helped interpret during meetings with Mr. 
Tirone.107 
Ms. Rozanski filed a complaint with the DOJ alleging that Mr. 
Tirone’s failure to provide a qualified sign language interpreter violated 
Title III.108  Ms. Rozanski claimed that she did not always understand 
Mr. Tirone.109  She also claimed that the methods he used for 
communicating resulted in higher charges to her because “use of these 
alternatives took longer than would have occurred had a qualified sign 
language interpreter been used.”110  Mr. Tirone responded to Ms. 
Rozanski’s allegations, claiming that he “represented Ms. Rozanski 
adequately and professionally, and that he effectively communicated 
with her.”111  He also believed that Ms. Rozanski always understood 
him.112 
                                                 
102 Id. 
103 Tirone Settlement Agreement, supra note 99, ¶ 4. 
104 Id. ¶ 5. 
105 Id. ¶ 6. 
106 Id. ¶ 8. 
107 Elizabeth Stull, Hearing the Legal Needs of the Deaf in New York, DAILY RECORD 
(Rochester, NY), Feb. 6, 2009, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4180/ 
is_20090206/ai_n31322102/. 
108 Tirone Settlement Agreement, supra 99, ¶¶ 3, 9. 
109 Id. ¶ 8. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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The DOJ investigated Ms. Rozanski’s complaint and concluded that 
her allegations were meritorious.113  In light of this finding, Mr. Tirone 
entered into a settlement agreement with the United States 
Government.114  Under the terms of the Agreement, Mr. Tirone agreed to 
pay Ms. Rozanski $2,200 and to forfeit any money she still owed him.115  
Mr. Tirone acknowledged a single ADA violation and agreed to comply 
with the terms set forth in the settlement agreement with the United 
States.116  The DOJ’s findings included a determination that it was 
inappropriate to use a family member as a sign language interpreter 
when the matter involved domestic violence.117  The Agreement’s 
findings went on to state that Ms. Rozanski’s sister was not qualified to 
interpret because she “had no specialized training in interpreting legal 
terms.”118  Despite the DOJ’s findings, Mr. Tirone continues to feel “like 
[he] zealously represented [his] client within the bounds of the law and 
procured a favorable result for her.”119 
Ms. Rozanksi’s experience does not stand alone.  In April, 2002, 
Carolyn Tanaka’s six-year-old son was admitted to the University of 
New Mexico Hospital for three days.120  Ms. Tanaka is also deaf and uses 
American Sign Language to communicate.  She alleged that the hospital, 
on numerous occasions, did not provide a qualified sign language 
interpreter as required by law.121  Ms. Tanaka retained lawyer Joseph 
Camacho of Albuquerque in order to pursue her legal claim against the 
hospital.122 
Ms. Tanaka repeatedly asked Mr. Camacho to provide a qualified 
interpreter for their meetings.  But like the hospital, Ms. Tanaka’s lawyer 
failed to provide the auxiliary aid or service necessary to communicate 
with his client, as required by law.123  Mr. Camacho instead expected 
Ms. Tanaka’s then nine-year-old son to “interpret” their meetings.124  
Ultimately, Mr. Camacho withdrew from Ms. Tanaka’s case.125 
                                                 
113 Id. ¶ 20. 
114 Id. ¶ 1. 
115 Id. ¶ 22. 
116 Id. ¶¶ 21–30. 
117 Id. ¶ 19. 
118 Id. 
119 Stull, supra note 107 (quoting Mr. Tirone). 
120 Camacho Settlement Agreement, supra note 99, ¶ 3. 
121 Id.; see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2006) 
(defining public accommodation to include hospitals under Title III). 
122 Camacho Settlement Agreement, supra note 99, ¶ 3. 
123 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F). 
124 Camacho Settlement Agreement, supra note 99, ¶ 3. 
125 Id. 
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Ms. Tanaka contacted the National Association of the Deaf (“NAD”) 
about her problems with Mr. Camacho.  The NAD filed a complaint with 
the DOJ, “alleging that Mr. Camacho refused to secure a qualified sign 
language interpreter when necessary to ensure effective communication 
with her.”126  The complaint against Mr. Camacho included evidence of 
his Title III violation in the form of a letter from Mr. Camacho to Ms. 
Tanaka.127  The letter included the following statement: 
It is my understanding that you refuse to cooperate 
unless I provide you with an interpreter, which will cost 
me approximately eighty dollars an hour.  I have never 
had to pay to converse with my own client.  It would be 
different if you did not have anyone to translate for you.  
However, you have a very intelligent son who can do it 
for you.  It appears that we are not able to work 
together.  I believe that you should find another attorney 
as I am going to withdraw from this case.128 
Mr. Camacho’s withdrawal left Ms. Tanaka without representation in 
her suit against the hospital, resulting in the dismissal of her claim “due 
to her failure to respond to discovery.”129  Mr. Camacho responded to 
Ms. Tanaka’s allegations by maintaining “that he was able to 
communicate effectively with [her] by means of written notes, e-mail, 
telephone relays and through the interpretation of [her] nine-year-old 
son.”130  Mr. Camacho also submitted a list of pleadings he prepared on 
Ms. Tanaka’s behalf as evidence that he communicated effectively with 
her.131 
The DOJ did not find Mr. Camacho’s response compelling.  After an 
investigation, the DOJ concluded that the allegation that Mr. Camacho 
failed to provide Ms. Tanaka with effective communication had merit.132  
Mr. Camacho subsequently entered into a settlement agreement with the 
United States government (“Camacho settlement agreement”).133  As part 
of the agreement, Mr. Camacho agreed to pay Ms. Tanaka $1,000.134 
                                                 
126 Id. ¶ 2. 
127 Id. ¶ 3. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. ¶ 4. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. ¶ 10. 
133 Id. ¶ 8. 
134 Id. ¶¶ 15–16. 
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The Camacho settlement agreement is a perfect example of why the 
threat of DOJ action carries very little weight.  Generally, alleged 
discrimination by an attorney against a deaf or hard of hearing person 
might be difficult to prove because an attorney can refuse a client by 
simply saying they are too busy.  The Camacho case, however, can easily 
be categorized as a slam-dunk.  Mr. Camacho would be hard-pressed to 
argue that he was unaware of his obligations under Title III because he 
was pursuing a Title III claim on behalf of his client, Ms. Tanaka.135  
Despite his assumed familiarity with Title III’s requirements, Mr. 
Camacho still thought it appropriate to request that Ms. Tanaka’s nine-
year-old son interpret their attorney-client meetings.136  Mr. Camacho 
seemed unconcerned with the fact that as a child, Ms Tanaka’s son was 
almost assuredly not familiar with the necessary legal terminology in 
order to adequately interpret his advice, never mind the fact that it was 
the child’s hospital stay at issue in Ms. Tanaka’s suit.137  Under these 
circumstances, Ms. Tanaka’s son was arguably the last person Mr. 
Camacho could claim as being both “qualified” and “impartial.”138 
Although the DOJ found Ms. Tanaka’s allegations against Mr. 
Camacho “meritorious,” they offered Mr. Camacho an easy way out—
pay $1,000 and agree to abide by the ADA and no further litigation 
would result.139  The settlement agreement even stated that Mr. 
Camacho’s reason for accepting the agreement was to “resolve [the] 
matter without further litigation” and, in exchange, the DOJ agreed not 
to investigate Mr. Camacho further.140  Mr. Camacho’s punishment 
under the settlement agreement, however, does little to “compensate the 
deaf individual for the discrimination that she has suffered.”141  
Furthermore, the $1,000 award is not likely to leave other attorneys in 
fear of possible Title III enforcement. 
The DOJ saw the Camacho settlement agreement as a major victory.  
In fact, Assistant Attorney General Wan J. Kim praised Mr. Camacho for 
“working with [the Justice Department] and recognizing the importance 
                                                 
135 Id. ¶ 3. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id.; see also DOJ TITLE III MANUAL, supra note 56, III-4.3200 (explaining that when an 
interpreter is required, the public accommodation must provide a qualified interpreter who 
conveys communication impartially). 
139 Camacho Settlement Agreement, supra note 99, at ¶¶ 10–16. 
140 Id. ¶ 11. 
141 Telephone Interview with Marc Charmatz, Senior Attorney, Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf 
(Nov. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Charmatz Interview].  Mr. Charmatz worked with Tanaka on 
her claim by the DOJ against Camacho. 
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of clear communication with clients.”142  The statements made by Mr. 
Camacho and included in the settlement agreement, however, hardly 
suggest an attorney who has recognized the importance of clear 
communication.  Kim went on to say that the DOJ hoped “that this 
agreement [would] be a model for other attorneys and law firms.”143 
The DOJ’s decision to settle for miniscule monetary damages and a 
good faith promise sends a clear message to attorneys—even if they 
violate Title III’s accommodation mandate, they are not likely to face 
litigation or stiff fines.  The DOJ’s current enforcement regime provides 
no incentives for an attorney to pay for an auxiliary aid or service for 
their deaf or hard of hearing client.  Non-compliant behavior is rarely, if 
ever, going to result in a DOJ initiated action, let alone a financial award 
for the plaintiff that must be paid by the non-compliant attorney.  
Aggressive enforcement of Title III is necessary in order to achieve 
widespread compliance by lawyers.144  The DOJ’s inaction merely 
reinforces the status quo—lack of compliance and unremedied 
violations. 
C. Why Title III Is Failing 
Title III is unique, both within the ADA and when compared to the 
CRA, upon which much of it is fashioned.  Title III is the only ADA 
provision that does not provide a damage remedy for private litigants.  
Instead, those suing under Title III are entitled only to prospective relief, 
in the form of an injunction.145  Congress lifted the remedies available 
under Title III directly from the CRA.146  Just as Senator Kennedy feared, 
however, the differences between the CRA’s anti-discrimination 
mandate and Title III’s accommodation mandate make the CRA’s 
remedies ineffective for many potential Title III litigants.147   
Unlike the CRA, Title III requires that public accommodations take 
proactive steps to ensure equal access for people with disabilities.  
Entities covered by Title III must do more than simply allow access to a 
disabled person.  Public accommodations must make “reasonable 
modifications” or provide “auxiliary aids and services” to ensure that 
                                                 
142 Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Albuquerque, N.M. Law Office Agrees to Provide Effective 
Communication to Deaf and Hard of Hearing Clients (Aug. 9, 2007), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/August/07_crt_598.html. 
143 Id. 
144 Bagenstos, supra note 81, at 9 (“[W]idespread compliance with the ADA’s accessibility 
requirements is unlikely in the absence of a realistic threat of vigorous enforcement of those 
requirements.”). 
145 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) (2006) (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (2006)). 
146 Id. 
147 See 135 CONG. REC. 19,888 (1989). 
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“no individual with a disability is . . . denied services.”148  Compliance 
with Title III often results in an expense to the covered entity, whereas 
CRA compliance can usually be achieved with a simple practice or policy 
change, such as the removal of a “whites only” sign.149  Title III and the 
CRA also differ in their definition of public accommodation.  It has been 
said that “the breadth of Title III’s coverage was purchased at the cost of 
the strength of its remedies.”150  Title III expanded the definition of 
public accommodation from three categories to twelve.  The trade-off, 
however, was that the compensatory damages remedy for private 
actions was removed from Title III.151  The discussion below illustrates 
why Title III’s limited remedies increase the number of hurdles a 
potential Title III plaintiff must overcome. 
1. Barriers to Private Actions Under Title III 
Deaf and hard of hearing plaintiffs who attempt to pursue private 
causes of action under Title III face a number of justiciability barriers.152  
Standing is one such barrier.153  In order to be justiciable, a plaintiff’s 
claim must satisfy the Constitution’s case or controversy requirement.154  
The Court has explained that in order to satisfy this requirement “a 
plaintiff must, generally speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered 
‘injury in fact,’ that the injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the actions of the 
defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable 
decision.”155  Therefore, because the relief available to a Title III plaintiff 
is prospective, he must do more than simply show he was the victim of 
discriminatory treatment.156  Instead, he “must meet the continuing 
violation doctrine . . . [by] show[ing] that there is a risk of the harm 
happening to him again [in the future].”157 
                                                 
148 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii). 
149 COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 184. 
150 BLANCK, supra note 15, § 17.1. 
151 See supra text accompanying notes 15–35 (outlining the legislative history of Title III of 
the ADA). 
152 See Alex Reinert, Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights Litigation and the Illusory Promise of 
Equity, 78 UMKC L. REV. 931, 943–44 (2010). 
153 Id. at 943; see also infra text accompanying notes 154–65 (explaining the development of 
standing doctrine pertinent to Title III analysis). 
154 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2; see also David Rudovsky, Lecture, Running in Place:  The 
Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1236 n.225 
(2005) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 213–14 
(2000); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997)). 
155 Spear, 520 U.S. at 162. 
156 Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1871. 
157 Id.; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“A federal court’s jurisdiction 
therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered ‘some threatened or 
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Lack of standing often prevents Title III plaintiffs from bringing 
successful claims.158  Standing became even harder for Title III plaintiffs 
to claim after the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Los Angeles v. 
Lyons.159  Lyons raised the bar beyond the “personal stake” requirement, 
“impos[ing] a stricter test, demanding a strong likelihood of recurrence 
of unconstitutional conduct.”160  Lyons involved a civil rights action 
against the City of Los Angeles.  The plaintiff alleged that, during the 
course of a traffic stop, he was illegally choked by a police officer.161  The 
Court, quoting O’Shea v. Littleton,162 said that “[p]ast exposure to illegal 
conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding 
injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse 
effects.”163  The Court held that even if the plaintiff was illegally choked, 
he did not have standing to sue because he could not “establish a real 
and immediate threat that he would again be stopped for a traffic 
violation, or for any other offense, by an officer or officers who would 
illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any provocation or 
resistance on his part.”164 
Under the Lyons “real and immediate threat” test, a person who is 
denied a Title III-mandated accommodation must show that they plan to 
return to the same public accommodation again in the future.165  Given 
this paradigm, if a lawyer fails to comply with Title III, their disabled 
client can only bring a Title III claim if the client demonstrates that the 
non-compliant lawyer will continue to represent them.  One can imagine 
the worst-case scenario—a deaf person, in order to enforce her rights, 
must sue her own attorney while expecting the attorney to 
simultaneously advocate on her behalf. 
Mootness also presents a barrier for Title III litigants.  A case is 
mooted when the complained of conduct has ceased.166  If a non-
compliant lawyer then complies with Title III at any point prior to trial, 
                                                                                                             
actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action . . . .’” (quoting Linda R. S. v. 
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973))). 
158 Elizabeth Keadle Markey, The ADA’s Last Stand?:  Standing and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 185, 186 (2002). 
159 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). 
160 Rudovsky, supra note 154, at 1236. 
161 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 97–98. 
162 414 U.S. 488 (1974). 
163 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting O’Shea, 414 
U.S. at 495–96). 
164 Id. at 105. 
165 Id. 
166 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) (“Simply stated, a case is moot 
when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable 
interest in the outcome.”). 
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the case against him is mooted because the complained-of-conduct has 
ceased.  The defendant in a Title III case has total control over whether 
the litigation continues and, in light of the Court’s 2001 decision in 
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health 
and Human Resources, they do not even face the risk of an attorney’s fee 
award prior to completion of litigation.167 
There is an exception available under the capable-of-repetition 
doctrine for claims found to be moot or that otherwise lack standing.168  
The doctrine applies when the following two prong test has been 
satisfied:  (1) the allegedly illegal action does not last long enough to 
allow for litigation to complete before it ceases; and (2) the complainant 
is reasonably likely to be subject to the complained of action again.169  
The Court has declined to extend this doctrine to civil rights cases 
involving requests for injunctive relief.170  This is unsurprising in light of 
the Lyons Court’s statement that “the capable-of-repetition doctrine 
applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only where the 
named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be 
subjected to the alleged illegality.”171  The Court’s stringent view of the 
doctrine precludes its use by most Title III ADA plaintiffs.172 
A Title III plaintiff attempting to invoke the capable-of-repetition 
doctrine to sue her former attorney will rarely, if ever, be able to satisfy 
the doctrine’s two prongs.  The first prong—that the allegedly illegal 
action does not last long enough to allow for litigation to complete before 
it ceases—seems achievable.  Once the deaf or hard of hearing person 
finds that an attorney is inaccessible, the need to obtain new counsel 
immediately necessarily limits the “challenged action” to a brief period 
of time.173  The second prong—the complainant is reasonably likely to be 
subject to the complained of action again—is far more problematic.  A 
deaf or hard of hearing person, once denied auxiliary aids or services by 
an attorney, is not likely to try and secure legal services from the same 
attorney in the future.  It is irrelevant that another deaf or hard of 
hearing person might seek the inaccessible attorney’s services and face 
                                                 
167 532 U.S. 598, 609?10 (2001). 
168 See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007) 
(discussing “the established exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition, yet 
evading review”). 
169 Id. (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)). 
170 COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 185. 
171 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983). 
172 COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 185. 
173 Id.; see also Markey, supra note 158 (stating that theoretically the challenged action 
would be seen as ending at the same point a court would otherwise find the complaint to 
be moot—when a potential plaintiff has secured counsel from another attorney). 
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similar discriminatory treatment.  The potential plaintiff in question 
would almost assuredly fail to satisfy the capable-of-repetition doctrine’s 
second prong. 
Howard Rosenblum, the Founder and Chair of the Midwest Center 
on Law and the Deaf, believes that many deaf and hard of hearing 
people do not have standing to sue the inaccessible lawyers they 
encounter because they obtain new counsel.  According to Rosenblum, 
these types of situations have probably “happened countless times but 
we will never know because [the] deaf [or hard of hearing] people were 
enjoined from suing.”174  In light of this, private actions against attorneys 
for failure to comply with Title III rarely, if ever, occur.175  Consequently, 
absent an expansion of the capable-of-review doctrine for Title III claims, 
injunctive relief is likely to remain a weak and largely ineffective 
remedy. 
2. The Dismantling of the Attorney’s Fee Award Provision 
Congress intended for citizens to have “a meaningful opportunity to 
vindicate the important Congressional policies which [civil rights] laws 
contain.”176  Most Title III plaintiffs are represented by solo practitioners 
who depend on the award of attorney’s fees.177  Because the recovery of 
attorney’s fees is often a private attorney’s only incentive to take on a 
Title III case, any limit on attorney fee recovery is devastating for future 
private action enforcement.  Traditionally attorney’s fees have been 
recoverable in private ADA actions brought under Titles I, II, or III.  
Because compensatory damages are not available under Title III, 
“statutory attorneys’ fees are likely to be the exclusive source of 
compensation for [plaintiffs’] lawyers.”178  Congress has expressly 
recognized the difficulty faced by attorneys who pursue litigation under 
civil rights statutes.  The Senate Report on The Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act of 1976,179 stated that 
                                                 
174 E-mail from Howard Rosenblum, Founder & Chair, Midwest Ctr. on L. & the Deaf, to 
author (Jan. 4, 2010, 00:31 CST) (on file with author). 
175 A Westlaw search for state and federal cases under Title III of the ADA resulted in no 
cases against an attorney by a deaf or hard of hearing client.  Waterstone, Untold Story, 
supra note 7, at 1853 (citing research by Colker).  In fact, there were only 82 Title III 
appellate cases through 2004, as compared to 197 Title II appellate cases and, through 2001, 
720 Title I cases.  Id. 
176 S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910. 
177 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 168. 
177 Id. 
178 Bagenstos, supra note 81, at 10. 
179 Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 
(1976). 
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[i]f successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear 
their own attorneys’ fees, few aggrieved parties would 
be in a position to advance the public interest by 
invoking the injunctive powers of the Federal courts.  
Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel 
fees . . . to encourage individuals . . . to seek judicial 
relief.180 
The Senate Report referred to what it called “fee shifting provisions” 
under which a court can order a defendant to pay the attorney’s fees of a 
successful plaintiff.  Fee shifting provisions are integral to the 
enforcement of civil rights legislation.181 
In 2001, Buckhannon effectively gutted the ADA’s attorney’s fee 
award provision, further hampering the efforts of Title III plaintiffs.182  In 
Buckhannon, a corporation that operated the Buckhannon Board and Care 
Home filed suit against West Virginia claiming that a state statutory 
requirement violated the FHA and the ADA.183  The state legislature 
responded by eliminating the statute and the case was subsequently 
dismissed as moot.184  Buckhannon claimed that attorney’s fees should 
be awarded under a “catalyst theory,” which the Court understood as 
“posit[ing] that a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if it achieves the desired 
result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the 
defendant’s conduct.”185 
Rejecting Buckhannon’s claim, the Court held that in order for 
attorney’s fees to be awarded in an ADA case, “a party [must] secure 
either a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree.”186  
As a result, if a defendant changes their practices and becomes ADA-
compliant on the eve of a trial, the opposing party’s counsel will be 
barred from any potential fee recovery.187 
Buckhannon’s impact is twofold.  First, it is difficult to see why any 
attorney would view a Title III client as attractive when the statute 
eliminates the possibility of a monetary award and voluntary compliance 
by the defendant can foreclose recovery of attorney’s fees.  Second, 
                                                 
180 S. REP. 94-1011, at 3 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 
(1968)). 
181 Id. at 4. 
182 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 609–10 (2001). 
183 Id. at 600–01. 
184 Id. at 601. 
185 Id. 
186 COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 170. 
187 Id. at 171. 
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Buckhannon effectively encourages public accommodations, including 
attorneys, to remain non-compliant with Title III.188  A lawyer can wait 
for a claim to be filed and then, at any given point prior to a judicial 
ruling, become compliant.  Litigation costs are the lawyer’s only 
incentive to comply with Title III sooner rather than later.  The lawyer, 
therefore, can avoid any additional cost above and beyond the cost of 
compliance while society, in turn, will see a decrease in voluntary 
compliance because lawyers now have little incentive to comply before 
litigation is initiated.189  For the ADA and civil rights statutes, 
Buckhannon left “the infrastructure still standing but kill[ed] the heart of 
[the] statutes.”190 
Buckhannon is also inconsistent with Congress’s stated desire to see 
the “broadest and most effective remedies” provided for civil rights-type 
legislation.191  The drafters of the ADA recognized the importance of a 
fee shifting paradigm in facilitating meaningful civil rights litigation—a 
paradigm even more crucial when the relevant legislation does not allow 
for recovery of monetary damages.  As a result, section 12205 of the ADA 
states that a court or agency “may allow the prevailing party . . . a 
reasonable attorney’s fee.”192  After Buckhannon, few attorneys can afford to 
take on Title III cases because of the significant risk that no attorney’s fee 
will be awarded.193 
D. Awareness 
Most lawyers are likely unaware that they must comply with the 
ADA and by extension, most lawyers likely believe that they can pass 
along the cost of a sign language interpreter to their clients.  While a 
study proving these assumptions is beyond the scope of this Article, 
there is plenty of reason to believe that they are true.  The Maine Bar 
Journal similarly asserted “[i]t is likely that few attorneys have 
considered the fact that law offices are covered entities under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.”194  Attorneys generally expect to pass 
client-specific costs on to the client.  In California, for example, absent a 
written agreement, “court costs and direct client costs are recoverable 
                                                 
188 Bagenstos, supra note 81, at 12. 
189 Id. 
190 Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights:  The 
Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1131 
(2007). 
191 S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910. 
192 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2006) (emphasis added). 
193 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12 at 168–69. 
194 Beth Gallie & Deirdre M. Smith, Representing Deaf Clients:  What Every Lawyer Should 
Know, 15 ME. B.J. 128, 128 (2000). 
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from [the] client.”195  Here, “court costs” can include things such as 
“travel expense, per diem, copying, facsimile, telephone, messenger, 
mailing, excess secretarial services, paralegal services, investigators, 
process servers, expert fees, [and] medical records.”196  The Comments to 
Rule 1.5 of the American Bar Association’s (“ABA’s”) Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct also state that “[a] lawyer may seek 
reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as 
copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone 
charges.”197  Given this paradigm, it is easy to see why absorbing the cost 
of a client-specific auxiliary aid or service is largely counterintuitive for 
most legal professionals.  Attorneys are likely to view the cost of 
auxiliary aids and services just as Rochester Attorney Gregg Tirone did, 
as cutting into the price of doing business.198  If attorneys do not know 
about Title III’s mandate, they will continue passing along the cost of 
auxiliary aids and services to their clients so as not to cut into their 
profits. 
The Tirone and Camacho cases are classic examples of attorneys’ lack 
of awareness of their obligations under Title III.199  Moreover, even if 
attorneys have considered their responsibilities under the ADA, they 
may mistakenly believe that they are not covered if they have fifteen or 
fewer employees because of what they know to be true in the context of 
Title I employment accommodations.200  The moment a deaf or hard of 
hearing person walks into a lawyer’s office, the lawyer must be prepared 
to accommodate her needs—even if that means scheduling another time 
to meet so an auxiliary aid or service can be secured.201 
Lack of awareness extends beyond awareness of Title III’s 
requirements.  Many businesses are unaware of the “extent to which 
disability is pervasive in the communities that businesses and other 
entities serve.”202  In order to comply with Title III, for example, a lawyer 
                                                 
195 Lindsay Kohut Slatter, How to Defy Fate By Fee Agreement, 537 LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. 
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (PLI) 265, 271 (1995). 
196 Id. 
197 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 cmt. (2010). 
198 Stull, supra note 107. 
199 See supra notes 104–19 and accompanying text (describing the Tirone case); supra notes 
120–41 and accompanying text (describing the Camacho case). 
200 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2006) (defining the employer to include those with fifteen 
or more employees, which exempts small employers from the prohibitions of Title I of the 
ADA); see also Stull, supra note 107 (“Title III, however, specifically mentions law firms as 
places of public accommodation.  Both the ADA and New York State’s Human Rights Law 
as well as attorney ethics codes state that law firms must provide clients with reasonable 
accommodations, unless doing so creates an undue burden.”). 
201 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F). 
202 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 63. 
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must not only understand her financial obligations under Title III—she 
must also understand the unique needs of her disabled client.  Not every 
deaf and hard of hearing client requires the same type of auxiliary aid or 
service.  Attorneys also need to know that “[s]igning and interpreting are 
not the same thing.”203  A lawyer must be flexible and work with the 
client to determine what accommodation will best facilitate 
communication between the lawyer and the client. 
IV.  THE THREE-E APPROACH TO REVIVING TITLE III 
If Title III is going to achieve its ultimate purpose, individualized 
attention must be given to the different types of public accommodations 
covered by the Act.  The multitude of disabilities covered by the ADA 
must also be considered.  A change that may benefit the deaf and hard of 
hearing community may inadvertently, and perhaps unexpectedly, be 
problematic for a different disabled community.  Although addressing 
the various solutions needed to satisfy everyone at the ADA table is 
beyond the scope of this Article, the following proposal shows what can 
be done to serve one population in need of one type of service.  It is 
intended that this will serve as the beginning of a continued dialogue 
about the specific needs of different populations and how those needs 
manifest themselves in different types of settings. 
As shown in Part III, the challenges facing deaf and hard of hearing 
individuals attempting to find an accessible attorney are multifaceted.  A 
multifaceted problem demands a multifaceted solution that attacks the 
problem from various angles.  This Part argues that the problems 
identified in Part III can be addressed using the “Three-E Approach.”  
This approach focuses on three distinct areas—education, economics, 
and enforcement—all of which need attention if Title III is to be of use to 
the deaf and hard of hearing seeking legal assistance.  First, lawyers 
must know their obligations to deaf and hard of hearing clients.  Second, 
there must be financial resources available to pay for the auxiliary aid or 
service required.  Third, both Congress and the Court must take action to 
change Title III’s current enforcement and remedial scheme.  Progress 
must be made on all of these fronts if Title III is to be the tool Congress 
intended. 
A. Educating the Legal Community 
Lawyers must know of their obligations under the ADA in order to 
be compliant; therefore, education is key to obtaining increased Title III 
                                                 
203 Tirone Settlement Agreement, supra note 99, ¶ 16. 
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compliance by the legal profession.  As a largely self-regulated 
industry,204 the legal profession must take responsibility for ensuring 
that its members are ADA-compliant.  Generally speaking, state bar 
associations control who can practice law.205  State bars also establish 
local rules and regulations for the practice of law as well as licensing 
standards.  Ethical rules are also promulgated by state bar associations.  
Most states model their ethical rules on the ABA’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (“MRPC”).206 
Theoretically, the MRPC already contains a provision requiring 
lawyers to provide communication access.207  The MRPC also requires 
that lawyers abide by the law, thereby reinforcing a lawyer’s ethical 
obligation to be Title III compliant.208  In reality, however, until the ABA 
and state bar associations make ADA compliance a priority, the current 
MPRC provisions are no more effective than Title III itself.  As “the 
national representative of the legal profession,” the ABA is best 
positioned to ensure that American lawyers are satisfying their duties 
under both Title III and the MRPC.209  If the ABA implements the 
following changes, “[w]idespread [n]oncompliance with Title III”210 
within the legal profession likely will become a thing of the past.  First, 
the ABA should amend the MRPC to include a Comment explicitly 
acknowledging a lawyer’s communication access obligations under Title 
III.  Second, state Continuing Legal Education (“CLE”) course 
requirements should include a mandatory class on the ADA and 
lawyers’ responsibilities under Title III. 
Although each state has its own set of rules for professional conduct 
for lawyers, all but California have adopted the MRPC put forth by the 
ABA.211  The ABA also publishes Comments to the MRPC.  All but eight 
states have adopted these Comments.212  Rule 1.4 of the MRPC regulates 
                                                 
204 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmb. (2010). 
205 See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF B. EXAM’RS, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR 
ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2010 (Erica Moeser & Claire Huismann eds., 2010) (setting out 
the rules and practices of all U.S. jurisdictions for admission to the bar by examination and 
on motion). 
206 About the Model Rules, ABA, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/model_rules.html 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2010). 
207 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4. 
208 Id. at R. 8.4. 
209 About the American Bar Association, ABA, http://www.abanet.org/about/?gnav= 
global_about_lead (last visited Nov. 2, 2010). 
210 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 179. 
211 See generally Model Rules of Professional Conduct:  Dates of Adoption, ABA, 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha_states.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (listing 
states that have adopted the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct). 
212 Only Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, and South 
Dakota have not adopted the Model Rules.  Id. 
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communication within the client-lawyer relationship.  According to the 
rule, a lawyer must, among other things, “reasonably consult with the 
client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be 
accomplished; . . . keep the client reasonably informed about the status of 
the matter; . . . [and] promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information.”213  In addition, “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the 
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation.”214 
The first Comment to Rule 1.4 states that “[r]easonable 
communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the 
client effectively to participate in the representation.”215  The obligations 
an attorney has under Rule 1.4 align with Title III’s requirement that the 
attorney ensure effective communication with their deaf or hard of 
hearing client.  Although some might think that Rule 1.4’s language is 
sufficient to make a Title III violation by a lawyer an ethical violation as 
well, this is not always seen as the case.  For instance, Marc Charmatz, 
Senior Attorney for the NAD, reported Mr. Camacho’s failure to 
effectively communicate with Ms. Tanaka to the Disciplinary Board of 
New Mexico.216  The New Mexico Rule of Professional Conduct 
regulating attorney-client communication is substantially similar to the 
MRPC’s Rule 1.4.217  The Disciplinary Board, however, did not view 
Mr. Camacho’s Title III violation as being appropriate for disciplinary 
action, instead claiming that Ms. Tanaka had a “discrimination claim.”218 
Bar associations play a central role in regulating lawyers and 
therefore are equally responsible for pursuing Title III violations, which 
would also seemingly result in a Rule 1.4 violation.  Despite violating 
both Title III of the ADA and Rule 1.4, however, lawyers like Mr. 
Camacho are often only punished for Title III violations.  In Mr. 
Camacho’s case, the Disciplinary Board of New Mexico’s refusal to 
pursue the grievance against him ran counter to the Board’s stated 
purpose—“look[ing] into complaints about attorneys licensed to practice 
law in New Mexico to determine whether the attorneys have violated the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.”219  The Association of the Bar of the City 
of New York serves as an excellent example of how bar associations 
                                                 
213 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2)–(4). 
214 Id. at R. 1.4(b). 
215 Id. at R. 1.4 cmt. 
216 Charmatz Interview, supra note 141. 
217 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4; N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 16-104 
(2009). 
218 Charmatz Interview, supra note 141. 
219 THE DISCIPLINARY BD. OF THE N.M. SUP. CT., http://www.nmdisboard.org/index.htm 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 3 [2011], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss3/8
2011] Lawyers’ Responsibilities Under Title III 1173 
should handle the duality of an attorney’s Title III violation.220  In Formal 
Opinion 1995-12, the Association concluded that, under the New York 
Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility, “[a] lawyer who 
undertakes to represent a client with whom effective direct lawyer-client 
communication can only be maintained through an interpreter must 
consider the need for interpreter services and when necessary take steps 
to secure the services of a qualified interpreter.”221 
The ABA has also recognized attorneys’ obligations to their deaf or 
hard of hearing client, stating that “[t]he most immediate concern for the 
lawyer is whether the client with a hearing impairment needs or requests 
an accommodation. . . . [L]awyers should ask clients what 
accommodations they need to communicate best.”222  The ABA further 
noted that an ethical violation occurs when a lawyer avoids an attorney-
client relationship with a person requiring an auxiliary aid or service.223  
It is hardly far-fetched to expect state disciplinary boards to pursue Title 
III violations as ethical violations given the ABA’s acknowledgement 
that lawyers have both Title III and professional ethical obligations to 
deaf and hard of hearing clients.224 
In order to ensure that state legal ethics boards do not forgo 
pursuing ethical violations simply because conduct is also illegal, the 
ABA should amend the Comments to Rule 1.4 to include the following 
provision: 
An attorney who has a deaf or hard of hearing client 
must provide and pay for auxiliary aids and services, or 
an effective alternative as defined by Title III of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, for in-person attorney-
client meetings.  Failure to comply with Title III of the 
                                                 
220 Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal 
Op. 1995-12 (1995), available at http://www.abcny.org/Ethics/eth1995-12.htm. 
221 Id. 
222 JOHN PARRY, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY:  A 
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE MANUAL FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES AND DISABILITY PROFESSIONALS 
119 (2008).  This reference manual was published by the ABA and is available on the ABA’s 
Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law’s webpage at 
http://www.abanet.org/disability/docs/client-lawyer.doc. 
223 Id. at 124.  Parry states the following: 
Regrettably, the tendency of some lawyers . . . to avoid such 
relationships [requiring auxiliary aids or services] in the first place or 
not actively solicit them . . . harms society, violates basic ethical standards 
of conduct for lawyers not to discriminate, is short-sighted in terms of 
building a clientele, and . . . may violate federal and state laws. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
224 See id. at 119. 
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Americans with Disabilities Act in representing a deaf or 
hard of hearing client is a violation of Rule 1.4.225 
With the addition of this Comment, state disciplinary boards could 
not claim that an attorney’s violation of Title III is outside of their 
purview.  Although an attorney may assert a Title III undue burden 
defense, a disciplinary board’s ultimate determination should not focus 
on whether a Title III violation occurred but rather whether the lawyer 
satisfied her ethical obligations.  Because the text of Rule 1.4 would not 
change, a lawyer must still “reasonably consult with the client about the 
means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished.”226  A 
failure to reasonably consult with a client, regardless of the reason, 
remains a violation of Rule 1.4.  Undue burden is not an available 
defense to ethical rule violations.  Once an allegation has been made, it is 
up to a disciplinary board to decide whether an undue burden defense 
can be appropriately considered.  This Comment needs to be 
implemented alongside the creation of Communication Access Funds, 
discussed subsequently, so that all attorneys, regardless of their 
individual financial situation, have the resources to afford auxiliary aids 
or services as necessary. 
The Comment will provide discrimination victims an additional 
avenue by which to achieve redress.  The more options victims have for 
recourse, the greater the threat of enforcement.  The potential for 
increased enforcement will incentivize attorneys to be proactive in their 
obligations under Title III, rather than reactive.  Ideally, when an 
attorney has a potential deaf or hard of hearing client, he or she would 
immediately begin a discussion of what auxiliary aid or service is 
necessary for the potential client.  The adoption of this Comment will 
serve to draw more attention to obligations that are often overlooked. 
The adoption of this Comment will also allow for testing on Title 
III’s requirements of recent law school graduates, who typically have to 
pass bar and ethical examinations before practicing law.227  Although 
each state bar examination is different, forty-seven states require that 
students pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam (“MPRE”) 
in order to practice.  By incorporating Title III into the MRPC, soon-to-be 
attorneys should have at least some knowledge of what Title III requires 
before they begin to practice.  This is only one small step towards 
                                                 
225 This provision is proposed by the author. 
226 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2) (2010). 
227 See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF B. EXAM’RS, supra note 205, at 28?31 (outlining bar and 
ethical examination requirements for all fifty states). 
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educating the bar.  It is not realistic to expect that the MPRE alone will 
ensure complete Title III knowledge among new attorneys. 
Lawyers in forty-two states are also required to take Mandatory 
Continuing Legal Education (“MCLE”) courses throughout their 
career.228  All states that mandate MCLE completion require that some 
portion of the courses taken be in ethics.229  In order to ensure that 
current attorneys learn of their obligations under the ADA, state CLE 
commissions or boards should require attorneys to take a CLE ethics 
course in attorney compliance with the ADA within their first three years 
of practice.  While it will be difficult to implement this requirement 
because it requires action on a state-by-state basis, this change should not 
prove impossible.  The structure and requirements for MCLEs are 
already established—this proposed change simply asks states to require 
one additional topic-specific ethics course for attorneys within their state. 
B. Economics 
In order to lower the cost of compliance for attorneys, state-based 
Communication Access Funds (“CAFs”), as proposed by the NAD, 
should be created to pay for costs of accommodation.230  Attacking the 
Title III noncompliance problem from an economic perspective requires 
a decrease in the cost of compliance.  This is especially crucial because, 
according to Professor Michele LaVigne, “most deaf people are using 
small firm or solo practice attorneys for things like divorce, small claims, 
etc.; [and thus] the potential lawyers don't have much money.”231  
Depending on the nature and length of representation, the cost for a 
certified interpreter can range widely as interpreters are usually billed on 
a per-hour basis.232  While a lawyer or law firm could claim that Title III’s 
                                                 
228 See ABA Ctr. for Continuing Legal Educ., MCLE Frequently Asked Questions, ABA, 
http://www.abanet.org/cle/mclefaq.html#over (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (showing that 
the range of hours required for ethics and professionalism classes varies by state, typically 
ranging from one to three hours per year). 
229 Id. 
230 NAD Advocacy Statement, supra note 13. 
231 E-mail from Michele LaVigne, Clinical Professor, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch., to author 
(Sept. 24, 2009, 07:27 CST) (on file with author). 
232 The cost of a sign language interpreter, which is typically charged per hour, varies 
significantly from state to state.  See, e.g., Contractors Providing Sign Language Interpreter 
Services, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.dshs.wa.gov/hrsa/ 
odhh/interpcon.shtml (last visited Nov. 25, 2009) (Level V interpreters cost $55 per hour 
with a one-hour minimum); Fee Schedule and Payment Policy, NEB. SUP. CT. INTERPRETER 
(2010), http://www.supremecourt.ne.gov/rules/misc/interpreter-payment.pdf (certified 
interpreters cost $50 per hour with a two-hour minimum); Mass. Comm’n for the Deaf & 
Hard of Hearing, MCD01 Rates for FY’10 and FY’11, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS.:  EXEC. 
OFFICE OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/mcdhh/ 
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requirements present an undue burden,233 the burden is measured 
against the entire financial health of the firm and not the profitability of 
the individual client.234  The Code of Federal Regulations identifies 
numerous factors that are to be considered when determining whether 
an accommodation is readily achievable, and thus does not constitute an 
undue burden, including:  the cost of the accommodation, the lawyer’s 
overall financial resources, and the lawyer or law firm’s number of 
employees.235 
The NAD proposed the creation of CAFs in order to address the 
cost-of-compliance problem.236  The NAD, in an advocacy statement 
supporting the creation of CAFs, stated that “[p]eople who are deaf 
continue to encounter significant communication barriers when 
attempting to obtain private legal services and representation, despite 
the mandate of the [ADA].”237  In response to this problem, the NAD’s 
proposed solution would “ease the financial responsibility attorneys and 
law firms bear in order to meet their obligations under the ADA to 
ensure effective communication with people who are deaf.”238 
Under the NAD’s proposal, CAFs would be created on a state-by-
state level by state bar and/or licensing agencies.239  The CAFs would be 
funded by nominal fees paid by all bar members in the given state.  
These funds would then finance the provision of auxiliary aids and 
services when a deaf or hard of hearing individual is receiving legal 
representation.240  Funds similar to the CAFs already exist in three 
states.241  In addition, Maine has a Legal Interpreting Fund that attorneys 
are allowed to use for client meetings and depositions.242  The creation of 
these funds would eliminate any potential “undue burden” claim by an 
attorney, who might otherwise find the cost of securing auxiliary aids 
and services overly burdensome.243 
                                                                                                             
sign_language_interpreter_rates.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2009) (interpreters costs range 
from $30–$67 per hour). 
233 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2009) (defining “[u]ndue burden” as “significant difficulty or 
expense,” and outlining the factors to determine whether an undue burden exists or 
whether accommodation is “readily achievable,” which is also defined in the regulation). 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 NAD Advocacy Statement, supra note 13. 
237 Id. (footnote omitted). 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 See id. (indicating that New York, Colorado, and Pennsylvania already have funds 
established). 
242 Gallie & Smith, supra note 194, at 130. 
243 Id. 
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In addition to the creation of CAFs, the DOJ should publicize the tax 
credits available to attorneys who do pay for auxiliary aids and services 
under Title III.  Under the Internal Revenue Code, a small business can 
claim a tax credit for expenditures made to provide access to disabled 
individuals.244  The tax credit “shall be an amount equal to 50 percent of 
so much of the eligible access expenditures for the taxable year as exceed 
$250 but do not exceed $10,250.”245  Although this law alone is unlikely 
to increase compliance significantly, increased awareness of the tax 
credit can only help improve the current state of compliance because the 
tax credit is an equitable sharing of the costs of compliance.246 
Attorneys must see compliance with Title III as the norm, rather than 
as an extra step.  Instead of thinking about the cost of an interpreter as a 
client-generated cost, attorneys and firms should have a line item in their 
annual budget for accessibility.  Providing an auxiliary aid or service is 
an overhead cost, similar to rent, utilities, and office supplies that cannot 
be recovered from clients.247  Making one’s legal practice accessible by 
providing an auxiliary aid or service to a deaf or hard of hearing client is 
part of the cost of doing business and should be treated as such. 
C. Increasing Title III Enforcement 
Title III enforcement must be increased if widespread compliance by 
attorneys is to be realized.  Professor Waterstone accurately asserts that 
“[l]itigation, or the threat of litigation, is a means to an end—narrowing 
the gap between what laws formally state should happen and what 
actually does happen.”248  This rationale follows the “deterrence model,” 
which “suggests that people obey the law when the perceived costs and 
probability of punishment outweigh the cost of compliance.”249  Without 
the real threat of litigation, whether initiated by the DOJ or via private 
action, attorneys have little incentive to comply with Title III because the 
probability of punishment does not outweigh the price of compliance.250  
                                                 
244 26 U.S.C. § 44(b)(1)(a)–(b) (2006).  A small business is defined as having less than 
$1,000,000 of gross receipts in the previous taxable year; or having employed less than 
thirty full-time employees during the previous taxable year.  Id. 
245 Id. § 44(a). 
246 135 CONG. REC. 19,841 (1989). 
247 See Molly Kilmer Flood, Cost Recovery:  What’s Fair Game?, 15 PROF. LAW., no. 2, 2004 at 
27, 27. 
248 Waterstone, New Vision, supra note 81, at 479. 
249 Jeb Barnes & Thomas F. Burke, The Diffusion of Rights:  From Law on the Books to 
Organizational Rights Practices, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 493, 495 (2006). 
250 Id. 
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Studies have also suggested that litigation achieves “greater accessibility 
than a nonlitigious collaborative approach.”251 
The ADA was designed to provide two avenues for enforcement of a 
person’s rights under Title III.  Congress created a private right of action 
for citizens who face inaccessible public accommodations and charged 
the DOJ with responsibility for investigating and pursuing Title III 
complaints.  Both of these avenues are largely unavailable, however, to 
deaf and hard of hearing individuals whose rights are violated by an 
attorney.  Legislative action must be taken if the original avenues for 
enforcement are to be reopened.  Congress must take the following three 
steps in order to revive the now impotent Title III into the tool Congress 
intended to create when it passed the ADA. 
1. Mandatory Government Enforcement 
The DOJ must aggressively pursue Title III complaints if the rights 
afforded by Title III are to have any meaning.  The ADA would not be 
the first civil rights legislation that Congress has revisited in order to 
ensure achievement of its goals.  For example, Congress amended the 
Fair Housing Act252 in 1988 after concluding that the Act, as it was 
originally designed, was not proving to be effective.  The amendment 
requires “enforcement by the Attorney General [AG] when the Secretary 
of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ‘determines that reasonable 
cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has 
occurred or is about to occur’ and a complainant chooses judicial rather 
than administrative relief.”253  Although enforcement of the FHA is still 
subject to the HUD Secretary’s determinations, the mandatory 
enforcement scheme did improve the system by which private parties 
and the Attorney General bring civil actions.254  Professor Ruth Colker 
has suggested that adopting this required enforcement scheme “would 
create a significant improvement in ADA compliance.”255 
When Congress passed the ADA, they chose to adopt the CRA’s 
enforcement and remedial scheme in Title III and hoped that it would 
prove successful.  We now have ample evidence that the “time-tested 
                                                 
251 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 12. 
252 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2006). 
253 Colker, ADA Title III, supra note 94, at 378–79 (quoting Pub. L. 100-430, § 8(2), 102 Stat. 
1619, 1619, 1628(1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(A) (1994)) (inserting 
section 810(g)(2)(A))).  But cf. DOJ TITLE III MANUAL, supra note 56, at III-8.1000(2) 
(discussing claims only pursued at the Attorney General’s discretion and only when there 
is “reasonable cause to believe that there is a pattern or practice of discrimination, or 
discrimination that raises an issue of general public importance”). 
254 H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 33 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2194. 
255 Colker, ADA Title III, supra note 94, at 412. 
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incentives for compliance and disincentives for discrimination”256 that 
were successful for the CRA did not succeed, with equal force, in the 
ADA.  Voluntary Title III compliance has not been achieved,257 making 
mandatory government enforcement a necessity.  Just as it did with the 
FHA, Congress should revisit the ADA and enhance the statutory 
government enforcement provisions. 
Under an amended ADA, the DOJ would be required to conduct at 
least an initial investigation of every individual Title III complaint.  
Congress would also need to allocate more financial and human 
resources to the DOJ for Title III enforcement.  In 2007, the National 
Council on Disabilities, in a comprehensive report on the 
implementation of the ADA, noted that the “DOJ should devote 
substantially more resources and time to investigation of Title III 
complaints, especially those regarding small businesses, in light of 
widespread noncompliance by these covered entities.”258  
Noncompliance by lawyers at small firms and solo practices will likely 
continue absent a legislative mandate that the DOJ take every claim 
seriously by at least conducting a preliminary investigation.  Lawyers 
must know that there is a threat of DOJ action for noncompliance, 
otherwise they have little incentive to comply in the first place. 
The argument for additional resources is likely to be met with some 
resistance, especially in light of the recent financial crisis.  Even though 
resources are tight, Congress created a statutorily vested right and now 
has the responsibility to ensure that the right is not being violated.  Title 
III vests the deaf and hard of hearing community with the right to 
accessible legal counsel.  Congress, therefore, has an obligation to revisit 
Title III’s enforcement scheme in order to ensure that the rights afforded 
by Title III exist in reality, rather than in theory.  Furthermore, DOJ 
enforcement must be increased alongside the adoption of a 
compensatory damages remedy for private action.  A compensatory 
damages remedy will encourage more private actions, and thus take 
some of the pressure off the DOJ. 
2. The Importance of Monetary Damages 
If the rights conferred by Title III are to have any meaning, they 
“must be defended from intrusion or violation,” which often requires the 
                                                 
256 136 CONG. REC. 17,376 (1990) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole). 
257 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 169 (“[T]here is 
general acknowledgement that many public accommodations are not in compliance with 
Title III and are not, in fact, accessible.”). 
258 Id. at 17. 
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willingness of an individual to pursue a private action.259  Twenty years 
of experience with Title III have proven what Senator Harkin knew from 
the start:  “without the existence of damages as a remedy, you would not 
get widespread voluntary compliance or negotiated settlements, short of 
litigation.”260 
The remedies available under Title III should be amended so that 
monetary damages awards are available in private actions.261  Monetary 
damages should take the form of both compensatory and punitive 
damages.  Damages are a “well-established remedy” for wrongful 
conduct.262  Senator Harkin recognized the need for a compensatory 
damages remedy in Title III when he proposed a revised version of the 
ADA which allowed for compensatory damages.263  Although he 
acquiesced to the removal of compensatory damages from the final 
version of the ADA in order to gain support for a broader definition of 
public accommodation, it was not without the understanding that the 
issue may need to be revisited in the future.264  That time is now.  
Compensatory damages are already available in actions brought by 
the DOJ; therefore, it is not a stretch to also allow compensatory damages 
in private Title III actions.265  Furthermore, compensatory damages are 
already available under the other two major components of the ADA:  
Title I266 and Title II.267  A deaf or hard of hearing person who encounters 
an inaccessible attorney has two means of recourse:  file a complaint with 
the DOJ or find another attorney willing to sue the inaccessible attorney.  
Compensatory damages in private actions play an important role in both 
of these options.  First, it will relieve the DOJ of the burden of being the 
only avenue by which an aggrieved party can receive any monetary 
                                                 
259 Waterstone, New Vision, supra note 81, at 441. 
260 COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 181 (quoting Americans with Disability 
Act of 1989, Hearings on S. 933 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the S. Labor & Human 
Resources Comm., 101st Cong. 209 (1989) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin)). 
261 See Waterstone, Untold Story, supra note 7, at 1870 (“[S]erious consideration needs to 
be given to revisiting [Title III’s] remedial structure.”); see also NAT’L COUNCIL ON 
DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 202–03.  See generally Courtney Abbott Hill, 
Note, Enabling the ADA:  Why Monetary Damages Should be a Remedy Under Title III of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act,  59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 101 (2008) (advocating for the addition 
of monetary damages to Title III’s remedial scheme). 
262 Rudovsky, supra note 154, at 1213. 
263 See supra text accompanying note 18. 
264 See supra text accompanying notes 26–27. 
265 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(C) (2006) (providing for compensatory damages “not 
exceeding $50,000 for a first violation; and not exceeding $100,000 for any subsequent 
violation” in Title III actions brought by the DOJ (statutory numbering omitted)). 
266 Id. § 12117(a). 
267 Id. § 12133. 
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compensation.268  Second, the availability of monetary damages will 
incentivize attorneys to take on Title III plaintiffs who, in the face of 
increasingly limited attorney’s fees awards, are otherwise unattractive 
clients. 
Punitive damages, although likely to be awarded in only a small 
number of cases, are nevertheless necessary as they “will provide more 
of an incentive for private individuals to litigate their claims and for 
private attorneys to take more Title III cases.”269  Increasing the 
perceived cost of noncompliance will create an additional incentive for 
compliance.  Amending federal civil rights legislation to increase the 
amount of punitive damages available is not new territory.  Congress 
recognized the need to revisit monetary damages provisions in civil 
rights legislation when it amended the FHA.  The FHA Amendments 
removed the punitive damage cap of $1,000 that existed under the 
original FHA.  The House Judiciary Committee Report found “that the 
limit on punitive damages served as a major impediment to imposing an 
effective deterrent on violators and a disincentive for private persons to 
bring suits under existing law.”270  There is ample evidence suggesting 
that the same lack of deterrence and disincentives exist under the current 
version of Title III.271 
The availability of monetary damages under Title III also eliminates 
the justiciability problems faced by many Title III plaintiffs.272  Under the 
current law, “[c]ourts have repeatedly concluded that they lacked 
jurisdiction to hear ADA Title III cases, because plaintiffs’ individual 
instances of discrimination did not create standing to seek injunctive 
relief.”273  Courts will no longer face the lack of jurisdiction dilemma that 
results from Title III’s current injunctive-relief-only remedial scheme.  
Once monetary damages are available, deaf and hard of hearing 
plaintiffs will not have to choose between suing their attorney and 
foregoing their rights because they have hired a new attorney.  
Additionally, plaintiffs will no longer run the risk that a defendant will 
moot their claim by coming into compliance on the eve of trial.  While a 
claim for injunctive relief will be mooted if the complained-of behavior 
ceases, a claim for monetary damages will survive despite a defendant’s 
late-in-the-game compliance. 
                                                 
268 Id. § 12188. 
269 Hill, supra note 261, at 120. 
270 H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2201. 
271 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 12, at 179–86 
(discussing “[r]easons for “[w]idespread [n]oncompliance with Title III”). 
272 See COLKER, DISABILITY PENDULUM, supra note 17, at 184. 
273 Colker, ADA Title III, supra note 94, at 395. 
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3. Reviving the Catalyst Theory by Redefining Prevailing Parties 
Lastly, in response to the Court’s decision in Buckhannon, Congress 
should pass legislation explicitly defining prevailing parties.  Congress 
should reject the Court’s view that prevailing parties, for the purpose of 
attorney’s fee awards, only exist in situations where a “judicially 
sanctioned change [has occurred] in the legal relationship of the 
parties.”274  Instead, Congress should add to Title III a definition of 
prevailing party that allows for an attorney’s fee award under the 
catalyst theory.  The catalyst theory requires that courts apply the “three 
thresholds” test advocated by Justice Ginsburg in her Buckhannon 
dissent.275  Congress should amend Title III, as follows, to reflect the 
“three thresholds” test definition: 
A prevailing party is a party that crosses the following 
thresholds: 
 (1) “the claim [is] colorable rather than groundless;” 
 (2) “the lawsuit [is] a substantial rather than an 
insubstantial cause of the defendant’s change in 
conduct;” 
 (3) “the defendant’s change in conduct was 
motivated by the plaintiff’s threat of victory rather than 
threat of expense.”276 
A redefinition of prevailing parties to align with the catalyst theory 
will ensure that “aggrieved individuals [are] not left to worry, and 
wrongdoers [are] not led to believe, that strategic maneuvers by 
defendants might succeed in averting a fee award.”277  Congress’s 
explicit rejection of the Court’s decision in Buckhannon will confirm what 
Justice Ginsburg asserted in her dissent:  that “the ‘catalyst rule,’ as 
applied by the clear majority of Federal Circuits, is a key component of 
the fee-shifting statutes Congress adopted to advance enforcement of 
                                                 
274 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 605 (2001). 
275 Id. at 628 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
276 Id. at 610 (majority decision).  The  Buckhannon majority rejected the catalyst theory, 
and thus the application of the “three thresholds” test which it requires, because they felt 
the test was “not a formula for ‘ready administrability.’”  Id. (quoting Burlington v. Dague, 
505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992)).  However, as the Buckhannon dissent points out, the catalyst rule 
and the implementing standards (the “three thresholds” test), were “developed over 
decades and in legions of federal-court decisions.”  Id. at 628 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  In 
fact, before the Court’s decision in Buckhannon, the catalyst rule was being applied “by the 
clear majority of Federal Circuits.”  Id. at 623. 
277 Id. at 636 n.10. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 3 [2011], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss3/8
2011] Lawyers’ Responsibilities Under Title III 1183 
civil rights.”278  A monetary damages provision ensures that the private 
right of action provided for by Title III is not completely undermined, 
aggrieved parties are able to pursue private actions, and disability-based 
discrimination is further eradicated.279 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act showed great promise 
when it was enacted and has resulted in some significant change.  
However, the ADA has also been regarded as being “a symbolic stab at 
protecting the rights of persons with disabilities and attempting to end 
discrimination.”280  Many of the rights afforded by Title III remain 
illusory because people are unable to enforce them.  As a practical 
matter, many deaf people are unable to retain lawyers for critical legal 
matters including criminal law proceedings, family law issues, probate, 
and employment law matters. 
There must be change in order to achieve what Congress initially 
envisioned—compliance by public accommodations including the offices 
of lawyers.281  With a coordinated effort, however, change is not only 
possible but achievable.  Three key things must occur.  First, lawyers 
must be better educated about their obligations under Title III of the 
ADA.  Second, state-based Communication Access Funds must be 
created to ensure that attorneys are able to fund the provision of the 
auxiliary aids and services required under Title III.  Lastly, Congress 
must make legislative changes to strengthen Title III’s enforcement both 
by the government and through private actions.  These changes will 
move us significantly closer to a day where deaf and hard of hearing 
individuals will find accessible counsel the norm rather than the 
exception. 
These changes, however, should mark the beginning—not the end—
of the effort to make Title III’s goals a reality.  Deaf and hard of hearing 
individuals will still face challenges.  Most people do not know the law 
well enough to realize that an attorney might be wrong when they claim 
not to be regulated by Title III.  An attorney can still refuse to represent a 
                                                 
278 Id. at 623. 
279 See Waterstone, New Vision, supra note 81, at 444 (arguing that Buckhannon created a 
“judicially imposed limitation [which] has undermined the ability of the private attorney 
general to bring cases for injunctive relief”). 
280 JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER, DISABLED RIGHTS:  AMERICAN DISABILITY POLICY AND 
THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY 144 (2003).  Title III, as enacted, does not have the teeth necessary 
to compel compliance.  See id. at 130–31. 
281 See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2006) (setting forth an attorney’s office as a public 
accommodation). 
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client without providing a reason.  These challenges cannot be resolved 
in one fell swoop.  Instead, changing the landscape of legal accessibility 
requires systematic and deliberate steps towards complete Title III 
compliance. 
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